Professional Responsibility of the Prosecuting Attorney to the Indigent Defendant in a Criminal Case by Cave, John M.
Missouri Law Review 
Volume 29 
Issue 3 Summer 1964 Article 4 
Summer 1964 
Professional Responsibility of the Prosecuting Attorney to the 
Indigent Defendant in a Criminal Case 
John M. Cave 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
John M. Cave, Professional Responsibility of the Prosecuting Attorney to the Indigent Defendant in a 
Criminal Case, 29 MO. L. REV. (1964) 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol29/iss3/4 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at University of Missouri School of Law 
Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Missouri Law Review by an authorized editor of 
University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact 
bassettcw@missouri.edu. 
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY OF THE
PROSECUTING ATTORNEY TO THE INDIGENT
DEFENDANT IN A CRIMINAL CASE
JOHN M. CAVE*
Many prosecuting attorneys, I imagine, viewed with considerable
consternation the decision of the United States Supreme Court in the case
of Gideon v. Wainwright., Visions-but not of sugar plums-danced in their
heads. Visions of long hours of preparation for trial, of endless days spent
in trial, and anguished moments of regret that a "felon" may have been
acquitted to continue preying upon the public have, no 'doubt, haunted
many dreams.
It is respectfully submitted, however, that the consternation is not as
justifiable as it may appear on the surface.
First, let us examine the duty and the power of a prosecuting attorney
in all criminal cases, and not necessarily those cases involving an indigent
defendant. The statutory duty of the prosecuting attorney is to "commence
and prosecute all . . . criminal actions in his county."2 In addition, he has
by implication other duties lying fairly within the scope of his office,
including those essential to the accomplishment of the purpose for which
the office was created and such other incidental and collateral duties as
may serve to promote the accomplishment of the principal purpose.3
Among the duties essential to the accomplishment of the purpose of
the office of prosecuting attorney are to make an investigation of matters
which come to his attention, including the examination of the available
evidence; to determine the credibility of the witnesses involved; to de-
termine the applicability of the law to the facts and the facts to the law;
and to assess the probabilities of acquittal or conviction. It would appear,
therefore, that his basic duty is to the public who, by their election,
have placed him in such a responsible position.
Commensurate with the duties are the powers vested in the office of
*Attomey, Fulton, Missouri (former Callaway County Prosecuting Attorney);
A.B., University of Missouri, 1938, LL.B. Harvard University, 1941.
1. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
2. § 56.060, RSMo 1959.
3. State ex inf. McKittrick v. Wymore, 345 Mo. 169, 183, 132 S.W.2d 979,
987 (En Banc 1939).
(339)
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the prosecuting attorney. Such powers include selecting the charge upon
which a defendant is to be tried; making a determination thereof not
by any hard and fast rule, but with regard to the special circumstances of
each case; choosing a certain plan or policy of enforcement which, in the
prosecutor's opinion, will best result in observance of the law; and filing
complaints and instituting prosecution, or refraining from doing so-all
in his sole discretion and not subject to the control of any other person.4
Usually, the only recourse in the event of the failure to perform the
duties of the office or for the abuse of the discretionary powers is defeat
at the polls when the prosecuting attorney again becomes a candidate,
or, in the most unusual and flagrant violations, a proceeding by quo
warranto as in State ex inf. McKittrick v. Wynore.5 Further, even after the
prosecuting attorney has instituted a criminal action, it is within his power
to enter a nolle prosequi if he, as a quasi judicial officer, in his sole discretion,
desires the prosecution to be dismissed.6 Neither the discretion to institute
criminal proceedings nor the termination thereof by nolle prosequi can be
controlled by any court.
The duties must not be fulfilled, nor the powers exercised, arbitrarily
or capriciously, but they should be based upon sound discretion in accord-
ance with the rights accorded to all persons by the Bill of Rights, the
Canons of Ethics, prior decisions of our courts, and the utmost reason and
wisdom possible.
With the obligation to receive and investigate complaints, to weigh each
case, and to institute criminal proceedings in such cases as he, in his almost
absolute discretion, may see fit, and with the power of virtually absolute
control of the case, the sheer number of criminal cases which pass across
his desk makes the studied determination of each case virtually impossible,
in most counties. In addition to the number of cases, there is another
factor which enters into the prosecution of complaints of criminal activ-
ity. This is the tendency to do things the easy way. It is often much
easier, and much less time consuming, to obtain, or attempt to obtain, a
confession from a likely suspect than it is to conduct the lengthy, detailed,
and painstaking investigation that often is required to complete a case
in the absence of a confession. The rack and thumbscrew, while very
4. State ex inf. McKittrick v. Wallach, 353 Mo. 312, 182 S.W.2d 313 (En
Banc 1944).
5. Supra note 3.
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effective for obtaining confessions even to offenses which were not com-
mitted, have long since made their unlamented departure. However, there
are cases, even of recent date, of violence in varying degrees which have
led to confessions by those accused of crime. Often, the prosecuting attorney
is not aware of methods which may be used prior to the submission to
him of the confession, but with the power and the .duty to prosecute goes
the responsibility for proper methods of investigation.
Further, as all that glitters is not gold, so all confessions may not
be what they seem. For example, in a case with which the writer had
some familiarity, a complaint was received by the prosecuting attorney's
office of the disappearance of certain cedar posts. The complainant had
cut and stacked a pile of cedar posts some distance from his house. A few
days later when he went in his truck to take the posts to market, he dis-
covered that they were gone. He made a personal investigation of many
sale barns, and at a sale barn several counties away from his home located
a group of posts which bore a great deal of similarity to the posts which
had been removed from his premises. Because of the lapse of time it was
not possible to obtain even a reasonably accurate description of the in-
dividual who brought those particular posts to that sale barn for sale at
auction. However, the records of the sale barn indicated that a resident
of the same county as the complainant had sold cedar posts about the
time the complainant had missed his posts. The check for the purchase
price of some of the posts bore the name of the suspect, and witnesses
recalled having seen a truck bearing that name at the sale barn at approx-
imately that date. Observation of the endorsement and comparison with
recorded chattel mortgages and other signatures of the suspect indicated
that the endorsement and comparison signatures had been written by
the same hand. In order to make as strong a case as possible, the complain-
ant was requested to saw about three or four inches from the lower end
of the posts which he had located, to match those sections with the stumps
remaining on his farm, to saw a similar section from the stumps which
matched the samples, and to return the sections to the sheriff's office for
safe keeping. About twelve to eighteen samples from the posts located
through the sale barn and from the stumps on the farm of the complainant
were obtained and no sample from the posts failed to match a stump remain-
ing on his property. Armed with this evidence, a warrant was issued for
the arrest of the suspect. He was arrested and informed of the charge
against him, and asked time to employ an attorney. After consultation
with his attorney, preliminary hearing was waived and the suspect was
1964]
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bound over to the circuit court for trial. Upon arraignment in circuit
court, through his attorney, the defendant entered a plea of guilty and
because of his past good record was placed on parole. He successfully
served his parole and was duly discharged.
Several years later, and long after the statute of limitations had
elapsed, you can imagine the astonishment of both the prosecuting attorney
and the defense counsel to learn that the suspect was not in fact guilty,
but that his truck had been borrowed without his knowledge, the check
made to the name shown on the truck, and his endorsement expertly forged
on the back of the check. Between the time of his arrest and the waiv-
ing of his preliminary hearing, the suspect had learned that another mem-
ber of his family, whose record was not so satisfactory as his own, had
actually been the culprit; and the suspect, out of a misguided sense of
family loyalty, had taken the responsibility for the offense and the risk of
possible refusal of parole, together with the other consequences which follow
from conviction from a felony.
At the other extreme from the over-burdened prosecuting attorney
who relies upon an unconfirmed confession, is the prosecuting attorney
who becomes over-active either as an investigator or as an inquisitor. As
long ago as 1901, the Missouri Supreme Court, in language indicating
that the practice was apparently not only of long duration but widespread,
criticized the practice of prosecuting attorneys acting as inquisitors and
exacting admissions or confessions from persons accused of crime:
The day seems to be distant in this State when prosecuting
officers will learn that they are not inquisitors and that it is no
part of their duty to endeavor to extort admissions or confessions
from one accused of crime.
7
In this case, the state had introduced into evidence the statement of the
defendant which was taken by the prosecuting attorney after the defend-
ant had been arrested and placed in jail.
It is not only permissible, but is desirable, for the prosecuting attorney
to assist in the collection of evidence in the course of preparation for trial,
and such assistance and counsel extends to the preparation and presenta-
tion of evidence in connection with the issuance of a search warrant.
However, absent exceptional circumstances, the prosecuting attorney should
not accompany the sheriff in the execution of the search warrant nor
take an active part in the investigation to that extent:
7. State v. Hagan, 164 Mo. 654, 675, 65 S.W. 249, 255 (1901).
[Vol. 29
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It is commendable for prosecuting attorneys to be deeply in-
terested in enforcing the law and to use their utmost ability and
knowledge to see that the state is properly represented, but it is
also their duty to keep in mind the fact that the duty of a pros-
ecuting attorney is not that of a partisan advocate, but it is his
duty to treat the defendant fairly under all circumstances and to
conduct trials on the part of the state in such a way as to leave
no room for criticism as to the methods used in trying to secure
convictions. It is much more desirable to retain confidence in the
purpose of the courts and other officers to enforce the law by fair
and just means than to try to secure convictions in all cases at
all hazards.8
It is often difficult for a prosecuting attorney to determine his course
of conduct in order to fulfill his duty of protecting the public and at
the same time to protect the rights of an individual under investigation or
accused of crime. The criteria set by the courts in the above cases, together
with the provision of Supreme Court Rule 4.05 that:
The primary duty of a lawyer engaged in public prosecution
is not to convict, but to see that justice is done. The suppression
of facts or the secreting of witnesses capable of establishing the
innocence of the accused is highly reprehensibleY
seem, however, to establish a sufficiently well-defined area within which
a prosecuting attorney can fulfill his dual obligations.
In this light, let us now examine the duty of an attorney for an
individual accused of a criminal offense. This duty is also set forth in
Supreme Court Rule 4.05:
It is the right of the lawyer to undertake the defense of a
person accused of crime, regardless of his personal opinion as to the
guilt of the accused; otherwise innocent persons, victims only of
suspicious circumstances, might be denied proper defense. Having
undertaken such defense, the lawyer is bound by all fair and hon-
orable means, to present every defense that the law of the land
permits, to the end that no person may be deprived of life or lib-
erty, but by due process of law.' 0
It would appear from the description of such duty, and it is generally
recognized, that the attorney for the defendant is a partisan advocate, in
8. State v. Nicholson, 7 S.W.2d 375, 378 (Spr. Mo. App. 1928). Also see
State v. McIntosh, 333 S.W.2d 51 (Mo. 1960) and cases cited there.
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contradistinction to the position of the prosecuting attorney. His sole duty
is to his client, within the bounds of the law, and for the attorney to adopt
any other attitude or approach to his defense would result either in the
determination of guilt or innocence by his attorney and not by a judge
or jury acting as a trier of fact, or of placing on the defense counsel also
the dual burden of representing the public and the individual. While society
has a direct interest in the punishment of persons who violate its laws, it
has a corresponding interest in seeing that only those who do violate them
are punished and that no man be caused to suffer the loss of his life, liberty
or property unless it be established beyond a reasonable doubt within the
general and well established rules of law that he is in fact guilty of the
offense charged. The arbitrary and capricious taking of life, liberty and
property by the Crown in early English history, the similar use of raw
power by Hitler and Mussolini, and the purges of Stalin should serve as
ample justification for the interest of society in the protection of the
rights of individuals. It seems to be the theory of our form of criminal
procedure that active and vigorous presentation of the evidence tending
to show the guilt of the defendant, with due regard for his rights as a
citizen, and the active and vigorous presentation of the evidence favorable
to the defendant, by an attorney whose duty it is to advocate his client's
cause within the limits of the law, will best achieve the balance, or ac-
commodation, between the sovereign and the individual.
Under our theory of the administration of criminal justice and in view
of the different attitude and approach which must be taken by the prose-
cuting attorney and by the counsel for the defendant, it would appear
that any attempt by a single individual to exercise both functions would
require him to assume approaches which are entirely inconsistent. It is en-
tirely possible, though perhaps occasionally difficult, for a prosecuting
attorney to investigate and prepare for trial his case on behalf of the
state without infringing upon the rights of the defendant. However, for
him then to assume the position of an advocate on behalf of the defend-
ant and to go beyond the mere advising of rights into the realm of
possible defenses, evaluation of the evidence and the law, and trial strat-
egy and tactics would place him in the position of attempting to serve
two masters with conflicting interests, which it is generally conceded,
is virtually impossible. All too often, also, the defense also involves either
an unpopular person or an unpopular cause, either of which would further
serve to place an intolerable burden upon the prosecuting attorney should
he be required, in theory or in practice, to assume a joint role in the
[Vol. 29
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criminal process. Obviously, therefore, the prosecuting attorney cannot,
and should not, in fairness to himself, and above all in fairness to the de-
fendant, either place himself, or be placed, in such a position.
Obviously, also, the trial court, because of its function in the judicial
process, cannot assume the role of an advocate in the representation of
the individuals who stand accused before it.
Generally speaking, sufficient investigation as to the facts and re-
search as to the law will have been undertaken by the prosecuting attorney
prior to the apprehension of the defendant to have convinced the prosecut-
ing attorney of a reasonable probability of guilt of the defendant and a
reasonable expectation of obtaining a conviction. Because of the pre-
sumption of innocence, we must assume for further discussion that the
defendant in question is legally innocent, but that there are sufficiently
incriminating circumstances to persuade the prosecuting attorney of the
guilt of the defendant. We find, therefore, an innocent defendant suddenly
being placed under arrest and brought before a court and informed that
he stands charged with a violation of the criminal law. The experienced
criminal or the professional criminal is usually sufficiently versed in his
rights as a person accused of crime to inform the court or the arresting
officer that he desires to consult an attorney. Under those circumstances,
the prosecuting attorney, knowing that the battle lines are drawn, can pro-
ceed with the case in the assurance that counsel for the defendant will
provide adequate representation.
The inexperienced defendant, whether indigent or able to afford
counsel of his own choosing, is often completely ignorant of his rights
as an accused person; or, if aware of them, is so unnerved by the proceeding
as to be unable to avail himself of them; is wholly unable to understand
the situation in which he finds himself; and therefore is most in need
of the protection of his legal rights. He finds himself standing, at that
moment, alone and unarmed, under conditions totally foreign to him,
the strength of his opponents not fully known, but apparently sufficient
to justify the issuance of a challenge in which his life or his liberty shall
be at stake. Remembering that our hypothetical defendant is innocent,
and that all defendants are innocent until proven guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt, can the prosecuting attorney do other than guarantee
that no unfair advantage shall be taken of his opponent, by providing
him at the earliest opportunity with an advocate capable of arming him-
self as the state is armed preparatory to the encounter?
19641
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Much has been said, undoubtedly in all sincerity, that the so-called
rights of the defendant are nothing but devices used to protect the crim-
inal. The essential point in relation to these rights, however, is overlooked
in such a statement. The judicial process is but the procedure by which
it is determined whether an individual is a criminal or not. The rights
are the rights of the person accused of crime and must equally apply to
all defendants whether guilty or not. A granting of those rights to the
persons who are not guilty and a deprivation of those rights from the per-
sons who are guilty would amount to a pre-judging of guilt and a substi-
tution of another and different process for determining guilt or innocence.
As the actual guilt or innocence of a defendant is immaterial to the
rights to be accorded a defendant in a criminal proceeding so should his
experience or inexperience and his financial condition or lack thereof
be immaterial in being provided with a protector for those rights. As
the obligation of a prosecuting attorney to prosecute all criminal actions
in his county is balanced by his obligation to assure to a defendant due
process of law, and as the judicial process is one for determining guilt
or innocence, the obligation to prosecute all criminal actions carries with
it the duty to see that all defendants are accorded the rights which are
common to all.
Except that an indigent defendant does not have the scope of choice
available to a defendant who can employ counsel of his own choosing, the
professional responsibility of the prosecuting attorney is neither greater
nor less to one than to the other. The rights of all defendants being in-
extricably bound together simply by reason of being a person accused of
crime makes it impossible to designate any greater or less professional
responsibility on the part of a prosecuting attorney.
A greater awareness of the obligation of all prosecuting attorneys to
all defendants, applied equally in practice to the indigent as well as to
the affluent defendant, would certainly serve to lessen to a great extent
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